

Message Text

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ORIGIN NODS-00

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S E C R E T STATE 204007 TOSEC 090156

NODIS
FOR TARNOFF ONLY FROM ANDERSON

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, UR, SALT

SUBJECT: SALT

1. WARNKE AND BRZEZINSKI MET WITH DOBRYNIN YESTERDAY. THEY WILL MEET AGAIN TOMORROW (AUGUST 26). SINCE THE NSC HAS SET THE SALT MEETING NOW FOR TUESDAY FROM 9:30 TO 10:30 A.M. I THOUGHT YOU SHOULD HAVE THE RECORD OF YESTERDAY'S MEETING TO BEGIN PREPARING MR. VANCE FOR THAT SESSION. WE WILL FORWARD THE MEMCON FROM TOMORROW'S MEETING IF IT IS RECEIVED IN TIME FOR TRANSMISSION. OTHERWISE, IT WILL BE HELD FOR MR. VANCE'S ARRIVAL.
2. BEGIN TEXT OF WARNKE MEMCON DATED AUGUST 24. MESSRS. BRZEZINSKI AND WARNKE MET WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN AT 12:30 TODAY. THE PURPOSE WAS TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS DESIGNED TO ELICIT THE BASIS FOR THE RESPECTIVE POSITIONS IN THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS.

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MR. BRZEZINSKI STATED THAT THE UNITED STATES REGARDS ITS PROPOSALS AS DIRECTED TOWARD PRESERVATION OF THE STRATEGIC BALANCE AND NEITHER DESIGNED NOR DESTINED TO SECURE ANY UNFAIR ADVANTAGE. HE NOTED THAT CIRCUMSTANCES AND TECHNOLOGY HAD CHANGED SINCE 1974 AND THEREFORE DEBATE ABOUT DETAILS OF THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDINGS WOULD BE UNPROFITABLE.

AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN MAINTAINED THAT THE SOVIET UNION

HAD MADE MAJOR CONCESSIONS SINCE VLADIVOSTOK, MOVING FROM THE "UNAMBIGUOUS" STATEMENT IN THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD THAT AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WOULD COUNT ON A ONE-FOR-ONE BASIS AGAINST THE 2400 AGGREGATE TO THE POSITION, ON WHICH HE INSISTED THERE HAD BEEN AGREEMENT, THAT BOMBERS WITH ALCMS HAVING RANGES IN EXCESS OF 600 KMS. WOULD BE COUNTED AS MIRV LAUNCHERS. HE ALSO OBSERVED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN WILLING TO ACCEPT OUR IDEAS ON A NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK, INCLUDING THE TREATMENT OF MANY OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES IN A THREE-YEAR PROTOCOL INSTEAD OF IN THE TREATY LASTING THROUGH 1985. HE REFERRED ALSO TO THE SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER REDUCTIONS IN THE AGGREGATE OF 2400 AS PART OF THE TREATY, ALTHOUGH THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD REFERRED ONLY TO CONSIDERATION OF REDUCTIONS IN A LATER STAGE.

AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN CONTENDED THAT THE UNITED STATES IS NOW ASKING THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO AGREE TO FURTHER REVISIONS IN THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING WHICH WOULD INVOLVE COUNTING BOMBERS WITH LONG-RANGE ALCMS ONLY IN THE 2400 FIGURE AND WHICH WOULD IMPOSE NEW RESTRICTIONS ON SOVIET HEAVY MISSILES. HE ASSERTED THAT THE QUESTION OF MAKING THESE TWO FURTHER UNILATERAL CONCESSIONS, WITHOUT SECRET

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ANY MATCHING RESTRAINT, HAD BEEN CONSIDERED IN MOSCOW AND A NEGATIVE DECISION REACHED. HE SAID THAT IF THIS IS THE AMERICAN POSITION ADVANCED IN VIENNA, THE ANSWER CLEARLY WOULD BE "NO."

MESSRS BRZEZINSKI AND WARNKE RESPONDED THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT BEING ASKED TO ACCEPT UNILATERAL RESTRAINTS NOT MATCHED BY COMPARABLE RESTRAINTS ON THE UNITED STATES. WHAT WE HAVE DISCUSSED WOULD INVOLVE SERIOUS RESTRICTIONS ON CRUISE MISSILES, INCLUDING PLATFORM LIMITS AND RANGE LIMITS ON AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AND A BAN ON DEPLOYMENT OF SEA OR GROUND-LAUNCHED MISSILES WITH RANGES IN EXCESS OF 600 KMS. IT WAS ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE B-1 DECISION MADE CRUISE MISSILES OF GREATER MILITARY IMPORTANCE AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE. ACCORDINGLY, THE UNITED STATES CANNOT ACCEPT RESTRICTIONS ON THE WEAPONS WITHOUT COMPARABLE RESTRAINTS ON SOVIET WEAPONS OF CONCERN TO US, I.E., THE SOVIET MIRVED ICBMS. AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN COUNTERED THAT THE B-1 DECISION HAD NOT BEEN MADE AS A CONCESSION TO THE USSR AND THAT ANY CRUISE MISSILE RESTRICTION WOULD ALSO BE IMPOSED ON THE SOVIET UNION. MR. WARNKE ARGUED THAT, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, ANY RESTRAINT WOULD AFFECT ONLY THE UNITED STATES,

AT LEAST FOR THE PERIOD OF THE PROTOCOL.

MR. BRZEZINSKI SAID THAT THE SUGGESTIONS WE HAVE AD-

VANCED WOULD IN NO WAY JEOPARDIZE SOVIET SECURITY. HE
ASKED THAT AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN CONSIDER A COMPARISON OF
U.S. AND SOVIET DATA WHICH WOULD SHOW THE OVER-ALL
EFFECTS OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS AND THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS
IN TERMS OF NUMBERS OF WARHEADS, EQUIVALENT MEGATONNAGE,
THROW-WEIGHT, ETC., AND ALSO SHOW THE RESPECTIVE
CALCULATIONS AS TO THE RESULT OF A FIRST STRIKE BY EITHER
COUNTRY AND THE FORCES THAT WOULD SURVIVE ON THE SIDE OF
THE COUNTRY SUBJECT TO SUCH A FIRST ATTACK. AMBASSADOR
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DOBRYNIN FIRST APPEARED TO CONFUSE THIS SUGGESTION WITH
OUR GENEVA "DATA BANK" POSITION AND COMMENTED THAT THIS
WOULD PROBABLY BE WORKED OUT IN THE FINAL SALT II STAGE.
AFTER CLARIFICATION, HE SAID THAT, GIVEN THE WAY THE
SOVIET GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS, THERE IS NO CHANCE HE WOULD
BE ABLE TO GET SUCH FIGURES AND COMPARE THEM WITH OURS
WITHIN THE TIME REMAINING BEFORE THE VIENNA MEETING.

AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING, AMBASSADOR
DOBRYNIN SAID THAT HE HAD PREVIOUSLY REPORTED TO MOSCOW
THE RATIONALE FOR OUR POSITION ON SOVIET HEAVY MISSILES
AS EXPLAINED TO HIM LAST FRIDAY AND THAT HE WOULD NOW
REPORT ON OUR VIEWS WITH REGARD TO THE TREATMENT OF
BOMBERS WITH LONG-RANGE ALCMS UNDER THE AGGREGATES. HE
CONTINUED TO EXPRESS DEEP PESSIMISM ABOUT THE PROSPECTS
FOR ANY PROGRESS IN THE SEPTEMBER MEETINGS BETWEEN
SECRETARY VANCE AND FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO IN THE LIGHT
OF THESE U.S. POSITIONS. HE REMARKED THAT THE
INESCAPABLE IMPRESSION WOULD BE THAT THE UNITED STATES
HAD FORCED THE SOVIET UNION TO CONCEDE ALL ACROSS-THE-
BOARD AND THAT THIS COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED. HE
SUGGESTED, HOWEVER, THAT WE GIVE HIM SOME DETAILS ON
THE CALCULATIONS THAT WE CONTEND PROVE THAT THE U.S.
PROPOSALS WOULD CONFER NO UNFAIR ADVANTAGE ON THE
UNITED STATES. IT WAS TENTATIVELY AGREED THAT WE WOULD
MEET AGAIN ON FRIDAY MORNING AT 10 O'CLOCK.
END TEXT. CHRISTOPHER

SECRET

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